Ulas Sener

Die relative Autonomie der Zentralbank

Eine politökonomische Analyse der türkischen Geldpolitik nach 2001



ISBN: 978-3-86956-362-6
393 pages
Release year 2016

Series: Potsdam Economic Studies , 5

20,00 

This book examines the relationship between central bank independence and monetary policy in Turkey with a political economic approach. Focusing on the Turkish example, it addresses the theoretical and empirical questions that arise in connection with central bank independence. It analyses the Turkish central bank’s institutional statue and its implications for monetary policy since its formal independence in 2001. The main outcome is that Turkey’s central bank cannot be regarded as an independent and depoliticized monetary institution, not least due to the high political pressure the ruling Justice and Development  Party was able to put on monetary policy decision, especially after the global financial crises 2007-08. The book investigates further domestic and international political economic conditions and developments in regards to the exertion of influence on the Turkish monetary policy. The case of Turkey shows that even a formally independent central bank is unable to detach itself from political interference, in spite of a strong ideology of de-politicized monetary policy. To conceptually grasp this outcome the present title proposes an understanding of the CBRT’s institutional status as one of ‘relative autonomy’.

This book examines the relationship between central bank independence and monetary policy in Turkey with a political economic approach. Focusing on the Turkish example, it addresses the theoretical and empirical questions that arise in connection with central bank independence. It analyses the Turkish central bank’s institutional statue and its implications for monetary policy since its formal independence in 2001. The main outcome is that Turkey’s central bank cannot be regarded as an independent and depoliticized monetary institution, not least due to the high political pressure the ruling Justice and Development  Party was able to put on monetary policy decision, especially after the global financial crises 2007-08. The book investigates further domestic and international political economic conditions and developments in regards to the exertion of influence on the Turkish monetary policy. The case of Turkey shows that even a formally independent central bank is unable to detach itself from political interference, in spite of a strong ideology of de-politicized monetary policy. To conceptually grasp this outcome the present title proposes an understanding of the CBRT’s institutional status as one of ‘relative autonomy’.


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gestellt an Dr. Ulaş Şener